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[W]henever we feel there is something odd in 
Christian theology, we shall generally find that 
there is something odd in the truth (G.K. 
Chesterton, Orthodoxy) 
 
Science in general…does violence to common 
sense…Aren’t you glad to be alive in a world where 
not only [is this] possible but you are privileged to 
understand why? (Richard Dawkins, The God 
Delusion) 
 
ow often does philosophy seem to be a matter of 
weighing one mysterious hypothesis against 
another? Alfred North Whitehead, acutely captured this 
H 




mysterious spirit of philosophy when he observed that, 
“Philosophy begins in wonder. And, at the end, when 
philosophic thought has done its best, the wonder 
remains.”i   
 
While Chesterton and Dawkins would disagree on much, it 
seems that they would concur that “biting the bullet” on 
one set of mysteries, rather than another, is emphatically 
not an arbitrary matter. Because there are mysteries, and 
then there are mysteries: By Chesterton’s lights, some 
mysteries bless the human spirit, while others damn it. 
“The morbid [materialist] logician,” he declares, “seeks to 
make everything lucid, and succeeds in making everything 
mysterious. The [Christian] mystic allows one thing to be 
mysterious, and everything else becomes lucid.”ii By 
Dawkins’ lights, some (common sense-confuting) 
mysteries cohere with scientifically-refined Reason, while 
others sacrifice such rationality for over-indulgence in 
“childish” tendencies toward dualism and teleology.iii  
 
My personal project while perusing this delightful 
anthology was to discern instances of this “mystery 
tradeoff” in practice.iv But I hasten to add that this text, 
which contains 20 debates on pivotal questions of 
metaphysics, epistemology, meta-ethics and theology 
bearing on Christian theism, is a wonderful resource for 
many other projects. For instance, any graduate student 
seeking to specialize in Christian philosophy (or, for that 
matter, “New Atheism”) would do well to become fluent in 
these interlocutors’ (mostly) agreeably-waged disagree-
ments. At the same time, I would observe that this is an 
advanced-level text: a reader will best benefit from this text 
if they are already quite familiar with the topics it treats, as 
well as various technical tools of analytic philosophy 
(possible worlds verbiage, Cantor’s set-theoretic paradoxes, 
Bayes’ theorem, quantified first-order logic, etc.)   




While the text is divided into two parts (“Debates About 
God’s Existence” and “Debates About Specific Christian 
Beliefs”), my own reading led to a three-(perhaps three-
and-a-half-)fold partition. 
 
(1a) Materialist Mysteries: One kind of mystery involves a 
claim which confutes long-standing generalizations drawn 
from common experience and straightforward intro-
spection—“common sense.” The quantum world is 
mysterious in just this way, but it has two saving graces: 
astonishing predictive power, and that we don’t go “down 
the drain” by having to live (as opposed to practice science) 
in such a world.v   
 
Christian critiques of materialist (a.k.a. “naturalist” or 
“physicalist”) positions often allege that they foist 
mysteries upon us without sufficient saving graces. In this 
spirit, William Lane Craig (§1) presents his account of the 
Kalam Cosmological Argument, which aims at the putative 
materialist mystery that Out of nothing, something 
sometimes comes. Craig stresses that a two-fold mystery 
confronts the believer in a God-less cosmos. For one, we’d 
need to think the universe “popped out of nothing,” in 
contrast with our common-sense views of cause-and-effect 
(“Why [then] do bicycles and Beethoven and root beer not 
pop into being from nothing?” [16]). But if we try to 
sidestep this mystery by positing an eternal universe, we 
end up confronting another blind alley: the cosmos contains 
an (actual) infinite set of events, thus opening the way to 
allowing “in concreto absurdities” akin to Hilbert’s Hotel. 
Not so, rejoins Wes Morriston (§2). A beginningless 
universe’s history might contain an infinite set of events, 
but this, alone, doesn’t allow for Hilbert Hotel-style 
absurdities—it does so only if those events can be 
somehow manipulated, but events can’t be so-manipulated. 
As for bicycles popping into being from nothing, allowing 




an uncaused cosmos need not entail uncaused events within 
that cosmos. (To be sure, Craig finds it mysterious that a 
metaphysical principle, Every event has a cause, should be 
inflexible within the universe, but relaxed outside of it. To 
which Morriston rejoins that positing an incorporeal God as 
Creator mysteriously confutes its own bedrock empirical 
principle: Material events only have material causes.)  
 
Similar dialectics arise for other disputes in this 
anthology. Thus Robin Collins and Victor J. Stenger (§§3-
4) wrangle over the fine-tuning argument from design 
(which aims to undermine the notion that From non-
design, design-like order may come). Collins alleges that 
naturalism leaves us with the mystery that (quoting Roger 
Penrose), “[i]n order to produce a universe resembling the 
one in which we live, the Creator would have to aim for 
an absurdly tiny volume of the phase space of possible 
universes.” (38) Thus, in lieu of such a Creator, the 
materialist would have us merely conclude that we won a 
very unlikely Cosmic Lottery. Against this, Stenger 
argues that the putative mystery is merely an artifact of an 
insufficiently nuanced understanding of “naturalism” 
(physical constants and probability theory, inter alia). 
Paul Copan and Louise Antony (§§ 7-8) offer a thought-
provoking exchange on the Moral Proof of God (versus 
the notion that, From valuelessness, value sometimes 
comes). Specifically, Antony’s response can be seen as 
confronting the Chestertonian charge—to wit, that the 
very mysteries Copan saddles upon the naturalist (e.g., 
that a Divine Lawgiver is necessary to avoid ungrounded 
moral truths) prove no less vexing on a theistic system, 
once terms of the mystery (X grounds Y) are scrutinized. 
And J.P. Moreland and Graham Oppy trade rival 
perspectives on the Argument from Consciousness (which 
militates against the notion that, From non-conscious 
matter, consciousness sometimes comes).vi  




(1b) Science, History, and Common Assent: Happily for 
civilization (and epistemologists studying “testimony”), the 
conditions for common assent—commonplace beliefs in a 
society—aren’t exhausted by the two conditions cited above 
for “common sense.” Most of us believe in a heliocentric 
solar system, despite the fact that this model isn’t obvious 
from experience, nor do more than a few of us introspect on 
the matter as patiently as Galileo did in the Dialogue 
Concerning the Two Chief World Systems. And most of us 
assent to milestone events occurring in 1066, 1215, 1776 and 
on Sept. 1, 1939, despite the fact that these events are 
unavailable to present direct experience and introspection. 
As several debates in this anthology illustrate, the disputes 
between Christian theists and their critics can sometimes be 
understood as collisions between “common sense” and 
(scientifically/historically justified) “common assent.”  
 
Evolutionary accounts of our epistemological faculties 
occasion one such collision (§§17-18). Common-sense 
intuitions about the physical world’s workings (“folk 
physics”) are notoriously unreliable.vii In accounting for 
this, evolutionary psychology avails itself of an intriguing 
gambit: that while our faculties are unreliable (as gauged 
by empirical physics), these faculties were nonetheless 
adaptive (as gauged by Darwinian natural selection). So 
far, so good. But theistic objections arise when their 
naturalist foes try to push this gambit further—to wit, that 
natural selection might have selected (or selected forviii) 
faculties which deliver “folk theology”—tendencies toward 
inferring incorporeal minds (dualism) and confabulating 
purposes for events (teleology)—on the basis of their 
adaptive value, irrespective of whether such theological 
intuitions reliably reflect some transcendental reality. Put 
plainly: the nontheistic evolutionary gambit urges that If 
God had not existed, then Darwinian Mother Nature would 
have invented Him for us, anyway.   




Joseph Bulbulia (§17) describes how a Bayesian calculus 
for rational belief-revision, coupled with the foregoing 
slogan, could challenge some theistic believers’ confidence 
of their theism—specifically, by increasing the probability 
of theistic-convictions-given-a-nontheistic-world (P[God-
convictions|God does not exist]), which, when it appears in 
the denominator of Bayes’ theorem (ceteris paribusix), 
would lower the evidentiary value of one’s theistic 
convictions for supporting God’s existence (P[God 
exists|God-convictions]).  (It’s easiest to see how this line of 
thought should give pause to those who evidence their 
theological views solely by subjective “religious 
experience.”) Against this line of reasoning, Michael J. 
Murray and Jeffrey P. Schloss (§18) offer a number of 
considerations to attenuate the challenge Bulbulia describes. 
For one, the challenge is plausible only insofar as we 
concede that evolutionarily-delivered mechanisms exhaust 
our epistemological faculties (which would presuppose the 
nonexistence of a sensus divinitatis as posited by Reformed 
epistemology). For another, the Bayesian pessimism is 
plausible only insofar as one presumes that non-theistic 
mechanisms suffice for the rise of human beings, human 
minds, rationality, consciousness, etc. (otherwise, the theist 
could rejoin to the pessimist’s slogan with, “If God had not 
existed, then Darwinian Mother Nature couldn’t have 
invented us, in the first place!”) But in light of the essays we 
canvassed in part (1a), such a presumption is one which we 
could expect the theist to reject. Lastly, even conceding the 
possibility that Darwinian Mother Nature could have 
engendered (false) theistic convictions/beliefs in us, this 
need not be grounds for religious skepticism—unless the 
atheist can distinguish this possibility from such practically 
idle skeptical possibilities as, A Cartesian Evil Demon could 
have engendered (false) material convictions/beliefs in us. 
At the very least, it takes some careful maneuvers to frame 
an evolutionary argument for religious skepticism which 




doesn’t already have elements of that skepticism 
surreptitiously “baked into” the premises.  
 
Evolution isn’t the only field of scientific common assent 
to inspire non-theists’ challenges to a traditional Christian 
metaphysic. Stewart Goetz (§19) and Kevin Corcoran (§20) 
spar over the implications of the neurosciences for 
traditional substance dualism. While Corcoran 
acknowledges that correlation between complex 
neurobiological- and mental-events doesn’t entail the non-
existence of mental substances such as souls or Cartesian 
minds, the neurosciences have a stubborn habit of elbowing 
aside immaterial items in explaining matters of clinical 
psychology. Yet “[i]f dualism were true…we would not 
expect to discover [such] thoroughgoing and deep causal 
dependencies of consciousness and experience on brain 
activities and states” (274). In response, Goetz observes 
that souls (or immaterial minds), so far as explanatory 
value is to be gauged, aren’t expected by the dualist to 
innervate physical explanations, but metaphysical ones 
(such as “explaining of nondeterministic choices or the 
possibility of life after death” (268)). This kind of 
distinction, of course, exemplifies a more general issue: Is 
it tenable to segregate Existence into (borrowing Stephen 
Jay Gould’s phrase) “magisteria” in such a way that 
empirical explanations reign in one (the “physical”), 
without contradicting those religious explanations reigning 
in the other (the “ethical” or “metaphysical”)? Julian 
Baggini and Keith Ward dispute this contentious question 
(§§23-24).  
 
Historians sometimes tell unlikely tales—and we believe 
them. If I’d first heard about Mt. Vesuvius from anyone but 
a history teacher, I may well have been skeptical. But I 
trust that historians are faithful to truth-conducive habits of 
justification in their circles; for that reason, their testimony 




can override my common sense skepticism. Should I follow 
a similar route when the tale is not just spectacular, but 
truly miraculous, as found in the Judeo-Christian 
scriptures? This is the question afoot in debates concerning 
the Gospels as historical documents (§§31-32), the 
historical Jesus (§§33-34) and the Resurrection as a 
historically-supportable event (§§35-36).  
 
At the risk of oversimplifying, these disputes seem to turn 
upon a simple slogan akin to the one arising for evolution 
and “folk theology”: If Jesus didn’t rise from the dead (or 
raise the dead or change water to wine, etc.), then the pre-
Scriptural Christian oral tradition could plausibly have 
evolved these “folk traditions,” anyway. Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, two of the theistic contributors to the topic 
of history and the Gospels (Stephen T. Davis (§31, 424) 
and Gary R. Habermas (§35, 479)) suspect that the 
foregoing “anthropological slogan” owes at least some of 
its inspiration to an a priori commitment to a naturalistic 
“worldview.” Such a suspicion seems, to these theists, 
invited by their opponents’ seemingly abrupt secular 
diagnoses. For instance, Habermas suspects that the 
naturalistic presumption tacitly inspires James Crossley’s 
rejection of the Empty Tomb story in Mark 16:1-8 as 
“invented,” since Habermas finds Crossley’s explicit form-
critical grounds (§36, 487-489) to be merely “fragile and 
unconvincing questions” (479). Another example can be 
found in Davis’s perplexity over Marcus Borg’s seeming 
acceptance of the “anthropological slogan” when he 
relegates the miraculous claims about Jesus’ life to “post-
Easter beliefs” arising in the oral tradition (§32, 432-433); 
Davis is perplexed that Borg doesn’t wonder, “[W]hat was 
it about the disciples’ experience of the pre-Easter Jesus 
that made it possible for them later to [“rapidly”] arrive at 
such lofty notions [Jesus’ miracles, preexistence, divine 
Sonship, etc.]?” (428n8, emphasis mine). Davis’s 




perplexity in the face of the claim that (call it) 
“anthropological selection,” alone, could generate the 
Greatest Story Ever Told sounds familiar; it’s reminiscent 
of those theists’ perplexity in the face of naturalists 
claiming that materialist natural selection, alone, could 
generate all the grandeur of Human Life.  
 
But theists aren’t the only ones who are puzzled by their 
interlocutors’ seeming blind-spots. By the skeptics’ lights, 
theists who would urge a literal account of the Gospels 
appear to be under-attentive to the workings of oral 
traditions—to wit, that historical reliability might be a 
factor accidental to what would have made a “folk 
tradition” adaptive to its Ancient audiences (in the sense of 
being likely to be believed and/or re-told): “It is now 
clearer than ever,” Stephen J. Patterson remarks, “that oral 
tradition tries for gist, not reproduction, is malleable, not 
static, and develops in close relationship to changing 
community circumstances” (§33, 450). Moreover, while 
advocates of a literal Gospel urge skeptics to be more open-
minded towards the miraculous elements in Christianity, 
critics sometimes rejoin that Christian “open-mindedness,” 
in this context, seems suspiciously biased; specifically, 
Patterson is curious why he’s found that, in his experience, 
no “evangelical scholar [applies] the same openness to the 
supernatural claims made about pagan or Jewish figures of 
the past, or about the founder figures of other religions, for 
whom similar claims are made” (449).  
 
At the risk of oversimplifying (again), it seems the 
foregoing disputes are founded on a basic standoff. All 
parties are agreed that we would like our scientific and 
historical accounts to be parsimonious, but there are two 
main rival candidates for parsimony afoot. For one, we can 
speak of ontological parsimony: that natural events (“The 
disciples believed that Christ rose from the dead”) ought 




only to be accounted for in terms of natural events (the 
disciples’ culture, conditions of testimonial-transmission, 
etc.).x For another, we might speak of epistemological 
parsimony: that where we find testimony that X occurred, 
our (much) favored-hypothesis ought to be that X occurred, 
rather than some convoluted error-theory to “explain away” 
the testimony that X occurred.xi  
 
This brings us to the doorstep of abduction: that, from the 
facts, we ought to infer the “best explanation” of those 
facts. But of course, the criteria by which we judge what 
makes a theory more or less “virtuous,” in this sense, are an 
eclectic mix.  
 
(2) Theistic Mysteries: Physicist Eugene Wigner famously 
wrote about the “unreasonable effectiveness of 
mathematics in the natural sciences.”xii Whether or not it’s 
unreasonable, the effectiveness of (a priori) mathematics 
for practicing (a posteriori) science animates an empirical 
expectation: a theory that’s true (or at least rationally 
acceptable) ought to be sufficiently elegant—sufficiently 
“simple,” for instance, and fitting the evidence at hand 
without “ad hoc” additions to the theory. Thus, if a theory, 
when subjected to rational scrutiny, leads to “clari-
fications” which render it less and less theoretically 
virtuous, then to that degree the empirically-minded 
observer will find it mysterious that such a theory could 
be true (or at least, that other rational inquirers could find 
that theory rationally acceptable).  
 
Some of the nontheists’ essays in this volume allege that 
just such unvirtuous mystery attaches to attempts to 
conceptualize the Divine attributes. Thus Nicholas Everitt’s 
essay (§11) traces how hosts of counterexamples chase 
conceptualizations of the claim, “God is omnipotent,” into 
increasingly convoluted accounts. In the end, Everitt 




concludes, theists might do well to follow Peter Geach’s 
suggestion that omnipotence be replaced with a purely 
theological concept (that God is Almighty). Similarly, 
Patrick Grim’s essay (§13) probes how God’s omniscience 
(in the sense of knowing all truths) can be squared with 
now-familiar paradoxes: the Liar (does God know that God 
does not know this sentence?), Knowability (does God 
know that knowledge entails truth? And is His knowledge 
closed under logical consequence?), and Cantorian 
considerations (if a set of all truths cannot mathematically 
exist, in what sense can the mind of God know all truths?). 
As the epicycles mount in trying to save coherent concepts 
of omnipotence and omniscience, the nontheist grows 
increasingly puzzled over why theists don’t just concede 
they’re pursuing a Ptolemaic project: “One might propose 
changing logics,” Grim concludes, “One might propose 
changing concepts. But…[t]he logical problems facing 
omniscience seem to me as close to a knock-down 
argument as one ever gets” (178).  
 
In response to these complications, Charles Taliaferro (§12) 
and Jerome Gellman (§14) would take issue with my 
Ptolemaic analogy. First, Gellman offers a counter-analogy: 
when Russell’s Paradox led to a rejection of Naïve Set 
Theory, it didn’t lead mathematicians to jettison the 
concept of sets; instead, mathematicians refined the concept 
according to, for instance, Russell’s Ramified Set Theory. 
In this spirit, Gellman offers a “ramified theory of 
omniscience” (182), tailored to the specific theological 
purposes God’s omniscience is intended to achieve in the 
context of a practicing religious life. Taliaferro urges a 
similar turn, viewing the putative proofs of omnipotence’s 
incoherence as fallaciously taking the concept out of its 
proper context: “Religious tradition is full of claims that 
God can do what for us is impossible…but there is no 
claim I know of in concrete, living religious traditions that 




God can do what is absolutely, logically impossible…And 
some of the cases of so-called obstacles to divine 
omnipotence seem merely capricious or of only conceptual 
as opposed to real interest” (159).  
 
(3) Theological Mysteries: Taliaferro’s reference to 
“concrete, living religious traditions” prompts me to 
imagine a more sweeping (but religiously commonplace) 
reaction to the puzzles encountered in conceptualizing the 
Divine attributes. At least some of the churchgoers I know 
might actually be unmystified that nontheists (and overly 
analytic theists) are mystified by the Divine nature. “Well, 
what did they expect?” I can picture someone in a 
Chestertonian mood reacting. “Didn’t God tell us that, as 
the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways 
higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your 
thoughts?” (Isaiah 55:9) On this view, revelation exists for 
a reason: to inform believers on matters which outrun the 
reach of human epistemological faculties. Thus, tenets of 
Christian theology, if they are to be studied fruitfully, 
should be approached with (to borrow Davis’s apt phrase 
(417)) a “hermeneutic of trust.” Helpfully, a number of 
essays in the present anthology suggest some explication of 
this spirit of trust, as well as practice Christian theology 
within the context of that trust.  
 
A classic Hasidic anecdote answers the question “Where is 
God?” with “Wherever we let God in.” In this spirit, we 
can picture a theistic rejoinder to Carl Sagan’s skeptical 
slogan (“Extraordinary claims require extraordinary 
evidence”) to the effect that being cognizant of evidence as 
evidence for certain theological claims requires a special 
kind of receptivity to the evidenced claim: “If they do not 
listen to Moses and the prophets, neither will they be 
convinced even if someone rises from the dead” (Luke 
16:31). In his essay on “Christianity and Miracles” (§21), 




Paul K. Moser cites this gospel-verse (288) in the course of 
arguing against “any kind of historical empiricism as a 
means for adjudicating the resurrection of Jesus or related 
divine signs (291).xiii Instead, miracle-stories are best 
viewed as attempts to reach a reader’s capacity for 
“Faith…[i.e.,] the openness of our heart for God’s love” 
(294, quoting Emil Brunner).  For it is only upon 
experiencing Divine love that two conditions are met: (a) 
we have a “salient experience that serves as the cognitive, 
evidential foundation for a well-founded belief in God” 
(295); and (b) such an experience is necessary to achieve 
the transformation (conversion) of a believer’s heart which 
is essential to the Christian God’s plan for human 
redemption (294-295).xiv  
 
It is perhaps noteworthy that this process of human 
redemption can be seen as one way of meeting the vexing 
Problem of Evil, in the form of an “internal” theodicy 
sometimes called the Greatest Story Ever Told theodicy 
(which Gale credits to Alvin Plantinga (202)):  
 
1. Any possible world with the Incarnation and 
Atonement is better than any world without it. 
2. All possible worlds with the Incarnation and 
Atonement must contain evil. 
3. Thus, evil is justified in possible worlds with 
Incarnation and Atonement.        
4. But the actual world contains the Incarnation and 
Atonement. 
5. Thus, evil is actually justified. 
 
Several essays in the present anthology explicate (or 
critique) the Great (or mysterious) terms and conditions of 
this redemptive Story. Michael Martin critiques (§30) the 
Incarnation as incoherent, for instance, whereas Katherin A. 
Rogers offers an “Anselmian” defense of it (§29).xv John 




Hick’s essay (§28) describes how Christ’s role as a ransom 
(or debt-satisfaction or substitute-sacrifice) in atoning for 
human sin (including the notion of original sin), are 
theological concepts inspired by medieval social and legal 
traditions. Yet Hick is skeptical that Jesus’s role in atoning 
for human sin (via crucifixion) can be rendered plausible in 
contemporary moral terms. Even while Hick praises Richard 
Swinburne’s (§27) account of guilt and reconciliation 
between people as “excellent” (and it is), Hick nonetheless 
rejects the suggestion that Swinburne’s four-fold 
repentance-apology-reparation-penance-process of worldly 
atonement can be carried over to characterize an atonement 
transaction between a human being and God, whom “we 
cannot benefit or injure…over and above our actions in 
benefitting and injuring our fellow creatures” (381).   
 
Another complication with an account placing Jesus at the 
necessary center of a transaction for human salvation is the 
old puzzle of exclusion: Do believers in non-Christian 
faiths thereby become excluded from salvation (Heaven)—
or, worse, become candidates for eternal punishment 
(Hell)? Paul F. Knitter (§38) argues against such a 
conclusion, stressing that apparent Biblical claims of 
exclusivity are better understood as a poetic “love 
language,” similar to when one praises one’s beloved as 
one’s “one and only” (514). Knitter adds, (citing Krister 
Stendahl), that such exclusive (and potentially divisive) 
language ought also to be understood as an intimate “‘home 
language’…[to be used] within [only] our own 
communities in ‘the language of prayer, worship, and 
doxology.’” (515). In response, Harold Netland avers that 
such a stance (typical of efforts at framing religious 
pluralism) “is simply reductionism that refuses to take 
seriously the claims of the various religions on their own 
terms” (503). One compact way of putting this complaint is 
that a religious believer who also accepts religious 




pluralism seems committed to a mysterious stance (not 
unlike Moore’s Paradox) of affirming, I believe it, but it’s 
not true. Netland counters that religious pluralism commits 
us to claiming that “[w]hat is really religiously ultimate 
[what is True]…will transcend the conceptions of both 
theistic and nontheistic traditions” (503).  But such a view 
is incompatible with avowals within those traditions.  
 
The concern over Christian exclusion also animates Keith 
Parsons’ (§40) critique of the doctrines of Heaven and Hell. 
To be sure, some Christian commentators (e.g., Jerry Walls 
(§39)) try to alleviate the exclusionary worry by (a) 
speaking of Hell, not as a site of souls simmering over open 
flames, but rather as merely the negation of Heaven (“a 
perfectly loving [eternal] relationship with God and other 
persons” (530)); and (b) allowing for a “second chance” at 
Heaven in the afterlife, for those whose non-acceptance of 
Christ in their terrestrial lives owed to involuntary 
“political, social, cultural, or psychological factors.”  
Parsons takes issue with the foregoing doctrine’s apparent 
upshot that “there can be no such thing as someone who 
fairly and fully, and without ‘blind spots,’…reasonably 
den[y]” Christianity and that “such open-eyed repudiation 
can only be due to [quoting Walls] ‘concupiscence and 
wickedness of heart’” (543), thus rendering them unfit for 
Heaven’s perfectly loving relationships with God and 
others.  Or, to put Parsons’ challenge in the vocabulary 
which opened this section: Is it possible to spell out the 
requisite receptivity of an agent, an “openness of heart to 
God’s love,” in such a way that can explain open-eyed 
cognitive skepticism of Christianity, on the one hand, 
without impugning such skeptics as somehow emotionally 
foolish (or worse), on the other?xvi 
 
Just such a question illustrates how deeply the mysteries of 
Christianity in particular, and of spiritual faith (or lack of 




it) in general, engages with a person’s entire life-
condition—cognitive and affective, commonplace and 
cosmic. J.P. Moreland, Chad Meister, and Khaldoun A. 
Sweis have done a masterful job at collecting a volume of 
contributions which treat these matters seriously and 
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allowed to ascribe to the cause any qualities, but what are exactly 
sufficient to produce the effect” (An Enquiry Concerning Human 
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xiv To be sure, a skeptic can be expected to balk at the kind of 
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xv Is the Trinity essential to the Christian faith? Thomas D. Senor (§25) 
offers a concept of the Trinity inspired by a hybrid between Greek 
Orthodox and Latin Trinitarian theologies. This, he observes, allows for 
a doctrine for which, “[w]hile a good dose of mystery clearly abounds, 
logical incoherence does not” (346).  Timothy Winter (§26) sets aside 
the question of the doctrine’s logical coherence, arguing instead that: 
(a) the Trinity is “incompatible with a [scriptural] understanding of 
Jesus and the apostolic generations” (353) and (b) the doctrine’s 
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living faith. 
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the backdrop of real-life case studies of ordinary religious apostates—
individuals who once had religious faith (and hence requisite 
receptivity?), but later lost that faith. Such apostates are, at least in the 
experience of sociologist Phil Zuckerman, rarely deficient in open-
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